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The Changing Economic
Role of Defense
by Murray Weidenbaum
Introduction

The perennial debate in the United States
over the impact of defense spending on the
economy has been heating up. Those who
favor smaller military budgets cite the high
"opportunity cost" of diverting vital scientific
and technological resources from productive
civilian pursuits -- a diversion, they argue,
that undermines productivity at home and
competitiveness abroad. Advocates of this
view also try to show that a dollar (or rather
a billion dollars) for defense produces fewer
jobs than the same amount of money devoted
to non-military expenditures. High levels of
defense spending, they conclude, are economically unsound and sap the nation's
prospects for growth.
Another widely circulated criticism is that
of historian and best-selling author Paul
Kennedy. In The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers he warns that too large a proportion
of a nation's resources allocated to military
purposes rather than ''wealth creation" is
likely to lead to "a weakening of national
power over the longer term." Kennedy
specifically raises the specter of "global overstretch" on the part of the United States.
(On occasion, he refers to his concern as
"imperial overstretch.")
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt
Distinguished University Professor at Washington
University in St. Louis. This study is adapted from
an article appearing in The National Interest, Issue
Number 16, Summer 1989. Copyright 1989, National Affairs, Inc.
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For their part, the proponents of larger
military budgets cite what they believe to be
the signal advantages of defense spending.
Chief among these, they argue, are the favorable "spinoffs" of defense technology into
high-growth electronics, instruments, and
aerospace industries. These advocates also
focus on the large number of high-paying industrial jobs created by military outlays
(35,000 jobs for each $1 billion of defense
spending, according to former Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger).
It is fascinating to compare these two sets
of self-serving arguments, for they are literally mirror images of each other. Both camps
are united by the idea that defense spending
has powerful impacts on the economy,
whether for good or ill. Yet the truth seems
to be quite different. The economic experience of the period since World War II shows
that both critics and supporters of defense
spending have seriously overestimated its
importance.
Defense spending does generate broader
benefits than the obvious national security
benefits. Military research and development
produces important technological "spillovers" into the civilian sector. The education,
training, and physical conditioning that young
men and women obtain in the armed forces
are of obvious benefit to society as well as to
themselves -- especially when those skills are
applied to civilian occupations. However,
military outlays are rarely the most efficient
way of securing these desirable side effects.
A new treatment for AIDS, to take one
example of obvious importance, is more
likely to come from medical research than
from work on the strategic defense system.
The naysayers on defense have likewise
overstated their case. Despite high levels of
defense spending, new civilian jobs are being
created rapidly in the United States -- far
more rapidly than the nations in Western Europe who devote much smaller shares of their
GNP to defense. Since the end of World

War II, in fact, the relative importance of defense to the economy of the United States
has been declining. Different ways of gauging resource use over the past half century
support this statement. Defense outlays have
accounted for a declining share of the GNP
(see Figure 1), a declining portion of the federal budget, and a diminishing portion of the
nation's research and development funding.
Defense manpower has represented a declining fraction of the nation's work for~e.
Military outlays now represent only one-fifteenth of the GNP and an even smaller proportion of the nation's work force.
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The relative importance of
defense to the economy of the
United States has been declining
since the end of World War II.
Few of the largest industries produce significant portions of their output for the military. Many of the major defense contractors
sell the bulk of their products in civilian markets. Moreover, long periods of relative decline in the military's use of research and
development and other high-powered resources have not resulted in comparable increases in civilian demand, much less a pickup in U.S. productivity and growth rates. The
decade from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s
provides a striking case in point.
More recently, an analysis of the economic impact of the military buildup of the
early 1980s found no evidence of any "major
disruptive effect" of defense expenditures.
No substantial bottlenecks were encountered.
If anything, defense spending served as an
unplanned counter-recessionary force in the
1981-82 downturn.l
The economy of the United States is both
complex and massive. It is not readily propelled or retarded by the relatively small

Figure 1

Table 1

DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS
A PERCENTAGE OF GNP

INDICATORS OF U.S. DEFENSE
OUTLAYS, 1940-1988
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Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget,
Historical Tables, Budget of the United
States Govemment, Fiscal Year 1989.

share of GNP devoted to military outlays.
And the power of the U.S. economy to adjust
is substantial.

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1988a

1.7
83.0
13.7
42.7
48.1
50.6
81.7
86.5
134.0
252.7
285.4

15.1
591.3
83.9
211.0
192.1
181.4
225.6
159.8
164.0
229.4
243.5

aEstimated.
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget.

What then has been the actual impact of
military spending on the United States and
its position in the world? From a modest
level of about $1 billion in fiscal year 1938,
the outlays of the Department of Defense
rose to approximately $285 billion in fiscal
year 1988 (see Table 1). That, of course, was
a far more rapid increase than occurred in
the population of the country or the size of
the economy, or both. A similar upward
trend is visible if the data are corrected for
inflation -- or if manpower levels are used instead of dollar figures, although the annual
fluctuations are quite different in some time

periods. Because the overall American economy was expanding during the sa.me peri?d,
it is useful to focus on the changmg relative
position of military outlays.
The most substantial absolute and relative
expansion in U.S. defense expenditures occurred during World War II. In the years
since the deep and rapid postwar demobilization two limited-war expansions occurred
(Ko~ea and Vietnam), plus a buildup in the
early and middle 1980s.
The most important fact that emerges
from the historical record is that the relative
importance of defense to the American
economy has been declining since the end of
World War II. To be sure, the pattern is uneven. Nevertheless, the Korean peak of 14
percent of GNP was far below the World
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Changing Trends in U.S.
Military Outlays

War II high of 39 percent, and Vietnam War
outlays were proportionately lower (less than
10 percent of GNP) than during the Korean
period.

To a large extent, the decline
in the military share of the
federal budget during the 1970s
resulted from the more rapid growth
in civilian program outlays.
~he

high reached in the Reagan adminiswas a comparatively modest 6.5 percent m 1986 and 1987 -- a ratio that was exceeded in many peacetime years in the 1950s
and 1960s. Declines in that ratio are almost
inevitable in the near future because of the
s~bstantial reductions in defense appropriatiOns, and hence in the ability to make forward commitments, that Congress has enacted during the last several years. Thus,
ov~r. ~ very significant time period, military
activities have been a gradually smaller factor
it;t the American economy. In the 30-year penod from 1958 to 1988, the military share of
~he U.S. GNP declined in 17 years, was stable
m 1, and rose in 12 years. In striking contrast, civilian spending has been the growth
area o~ this nati?n's economic activity.
It IS also mstructive to evaluate the
changing role of defense in national priorities. The most widely used measure of that
relationship is to estimate the share of federal government outlays directed to defense.
The trend here is basically similar to that for
the ratio of defense spending to the GNP.
The large portion of the federal budget directed to defense outlays during World War
I~ -- over 90 percent -- has not been equalled
smce. A secondary peak occurred during the
Korean War, when defense spending accounted for almost 70 percent of the budget.
Since then, the defense share of the fedtratH~n
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eral budget has declined to a low of less than
23 percent in 1980. It reversed to a high of
28 percent in 1987 and is now declining. Account should be taken of the substantial expansion in the scope of federal civilian responsibilities during the 1960s, especially the
Great Society programs. To a large extent,
therefore, the decline in the military share of
the federal budget during the 1970s resulted
from the more rapid growth in civilian program outlays.
It is ironic to note that the administration's staunchness in preserving the defense
b~d~et in the early 1980s made it politically
difficul~ to make deep cuts in non-military
expenditures. Proponents of civilian spending ra~sed the issue of "fairness" in limiting
reductiOns to non-defense programs. During
the 1980s, federal civilian expenditures continued to rise in real terms and also tended to
maintain a relatively constant share of the
GNP. This experience runs counter to the
common belief that expansions in defense
spending invariably come at the expense of
civilian government outlays.
Nevertheless, military outlays are now under considerable pressure because of general
budgetary trends in recent years. A combinati.o?. of rapid ~xpansions in both military and
civilian sp~ndmg programs in the early 1980s,
coupled With substantial reductions in income
tax. r~tes, led to .unparalleled large budget
def~c~ts. The persistence of these triple-digit
deficits beyond the 1981-82 recession led to
institutional restraints on federal spending
(the CJ:r~mm- Rudman-Hollings legislation).
The military budget was a major target of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and increases in
appropriations for the Department of Defense by the mid-1980s were less than the
amount necessary to keep up with inflation.
Surely, the absolute size of defense purchases of goods and services looms large by
all available statistical measures. The Department of Defense is a major "customer" of
American business. Nevertheless, the overall
7

pattern is clear: the economic impact of defense activities in the United States peaked
decades ago and has been declining -- albeit
irregularly -- ever since.

Table 2
CHANGING MILITARY USE OF
RESOURCES, 1940-1988

Military Use of Key Resources
What should we make of the concern over
the American military's supposed ill use of
key resources? An analysis of the changing
importance of the military demand for key
factors of production is revealing; it hardly
supports the contention of a society
"depleted" by a military establishment hogging the vital resources of the nation.
The armed forces now represent only 1.7
percent of the total U.S. labor force, down
from a post-World War II peak of 4.3 percent
in 1955, but also down from 2.2 percent in
1975 (see Table 2). During the same general
period, the proportional decline in the military share of funding for research and development has been dramatic. In 1960, the Department of Defense obtained the lion's
share of the nation's scientific and technological resources -- 62 percent. By 1980, the
ratio had plummeted to 25 percent. In 1987,
the preliminary data show a 30 percent share
for the military -- less than one-half the 1960
proportion.
On the other hand, whatever their relative
or absolute size, the resources allocated to
national defense are not available for civilian
purposes. Especially in a fully employed
economy, it is reasonable to assume that, in
the absence of the military's demand, much
of those resources would have gone to meet
civilian needs (or wants). The question then
arises as to which areas of the civilian economy would use the resources that would become available following a reduction in military budgets. To an economist, the "opportunity cost" of expenditures for defense is the
opportunity forgone to use the people, machinery, and materials in other ways.
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Year

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988

Military
Manpower
Percentage
of Labor
Force

.8
18.3
2.3
4.3
3.5
3.4
3.6
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.7

Military R&D
Percentage
ofU.S.R&D

39.0
61.6
46.2

37.6
30.5
24.6
28.3

30.7
30.3

Source: Department of Defense and National

Science Foundation.

Investment versus Consumption
Do increases in defense spending come
primarily out of resources that otherwise
would be devoted to investment (a primary
ingredient in economic growth)? To the extent that such is the case, the "opportunity
cost" of defense spending is high. Every dollar devoted to defense would mean a dollar
less invested in the future of the economy.
However, if the money spent for defense
would otherwise go for current consumption
-- for items that generate little or no future
benefit -- then the true cost of defense is
transitory and much lower. Researchers who
9

,,
have looked into the matter are not in universal agreement. The possibility of defense
demands crowding out private investment
rests on the notion that a large and growing
federal deficit forces the Treasury to expand
its presence in capital markets, putting upward pressure on interest rates. Rising interest rates, in turn, inhibit capital formation.2
The empirical evidence on the causal relationship between budget deficits and interest
rates is not very impressive, however.3

Increases in the share of GNP
devoted to defense are accompanied
by reductions in the proportion
going to consumption, rather
than to investment.
It turns out that, in most cases in the
United States, increases in the share of GNP
devoted to defense are accompanied by reductions in the proportion going to consumption, rather than to investment. Kenneth
Boulding has obtained such results using an
analytical approach based on national income
accounts.4 The substantial rise in personal
income tax collections in the period since
World War II helps to explain this trend.
Civilian versus Military R&D
Another charge one often hears is that
military spending on research and development "crowds out" civilian R&D. Let us examine the period between 1949 and 1988, for
which detailed data are available. In only 16
of those 39 years did the military and civilian
shares of the federal budget move in opposite
directions. In 18 of those years, the shares of
the federal budget devoted to civilian R&D
and to military R&D moved in the same direction -- the civilian R&D portion rising
when the military R&D share rose, and
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falling when the military share fell. In 5
other years, the civil sector registered no
change in its share of the federal budget.
The "depletion" thesis does not hold up.
Expanding military R&D is at least as likely
to have a positive effect on civilian R&D as
the negative impact that is so often envisioned.
Moreover, reducing the military
R&D share of the federal budget is as likely
to have a negative effect on civilian R&D as
a positive effect.

The U.S. and the Global Economy
There is no shortage of studies that purport to show a close relationship between the
concentration of a nation's economy on defense and its poor economic performance.
Thus, the argument goes, the United States
spends proportionately more on defense than
Japan and, therefore, we have a consistently
lower rate of economic growth. Yet South
Korea, which devotes a larger share of its
GNP to defense than Japan, boasts a more
rapid growth rate. To jump to a heroic conclusion from either comparison is surely simple-minded.
Other factors -- such as the national saving rate -- are important influences on a nation's growth rate. Still, since it has become
fashionable to equate the comparatively large
percentage of U.S. GNP devoted to defense
with the slippage in the U.S. share of world
trade and global economic activity, let us pursue that point.
It is easy to show that the United States
has lost its supremacy in the global economy
in the four decades since the end of World
War II. In 1950, the gross national product
of the United States represented approximately 45 percent of the world's gross product. In the last few years, in striking contrast,
the U.S. share has dropped to about onefourth of the global total.
Again, some historical perspective is use11

ful. In 1950, the economies of Western Europe and Japan were still recovering from the
devastation of World War II. Under those
circumstances, the American economic giant
had little difficulty dominating world markets. But such a powerful position was bound
to be transitory, as the economic competitors
regained their traditional strength -- with
much help from the United States. The current relative position of the United States is
little different from what it was in 1938.
It is intriguing to note that the Soviet
Union did not take such a benign attitude. It
shackled the economies of defeated nations
within the sphere of its control. The poor
economic performance of the Soviet bloc
economies in the period since World War II,
however, is hardly a tribute to that approach.
Statistical comparisons, favorable or unfavorable, have their limitations. Thus, in the
1950s and 1960s -- when the economic power
of the United States was rarely questioned -a rapid spread of collectivist and anti-market
policies occurred in many parts of Western
Europe and Asia. In the 1980s, however,
during the period of supposed U.S. decline,
this trend has been reversed. In many parts
of the world a dramatic expansion has occurred in the role of market forces, economic
incentives, price competition, and the privatization of economic activity. Great Britain
and China provide two very different but
equally impressive examples of this powerful
change.
The doom peddlers always seem to have a
field day in competing for public attention.
Yet the United States remains the leading
power in the world. In 1988, America's
farms, mines, factories, and offices produced
almost $5 trillion of goods and services -- a
record high and more than double secondplace Japan's GNP of just over $2 trillion.
New Factors on the World Stage
Any realistic assessment of the position of
the United States in the world economy must
12

take account of important new factors in the
economic equation. To a substantial degree,
the impact of domestic considerations such
as defense spending is overshadowed by the
new competition from an array of developing
countries that have joined, or are about to
join, the club of advanced industrial nations.

Changes in the economic power of
individual nations make for a stronger
international commercial system.

Economic history provides a useful perspective. In the nineteenth century, European investors financed much of the canals,
railroads, and heavy industry that enabled the
United States to become a global economic
power. But that also eliminated the European monopoly over the world economy.
Nevertheless, Europe's international trade
continued to rise substantially in absolute
terms. Something similar is underway today.
Investment funds provided by the United
States and the other developed nations have
helped to create a new set of actors on the
world economic stage, mainly in the Asian
rim. Once again, the return to the status quo
ante is not in the cards. In the short run, the
adjustments are painful to many established
sectors of the more advanced societies.
Over the long run, these changes in the
economic power of individual nations make
for a stronger international commercial system. Our best customers today are the other
advanced economies.
The resulting expanded flow of international trade and investment yields higher living standards for
consumers in general. That was the experience of the nineteenth century, and it is being
repeated as we approach the twenty-first century.
13

Conclusion
None of the foregoing discussion should
be taken to minimize the importance of fiscal
prudence. Of course the portion of our national resources devoted to military purposes
should be carefully scrutinized; of course the
serious shortcomings in the military procurement process should be dealt with
promptly.
But the U.S. position in future international rankings will depend in large measure
on matters quite independent of the military.
These include controlling production costs,
enhancing productivity, improving the education of our work force, and promoting national competitiveness in other ways. The
outcome, given some tough decisions on
public budgets and private productivity, is not
likely to be as dismal as the doom peddlers
would have us believe.
One experienced observer, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, predicts that in the year 2010 the
United States and the European Economic
Community will be the two dominant forces
in the world economy. In "America's New
Geostrategy," an article that appeared in Foreign Affairs last spring, he estimated that each
will generate in that time period an annual
GNP of approximately $8 trillion -- double or
more that of Japan, China, or Russia. That
result would not be too shabby for a nation so
heavily criticized for "overstretch." If anything, it is the Soviet Union -- which both devotes a far larger share of its national resources to military purposes and suffers from
a combination of low productivity, slow
growth, and great pressures of unmet civilian
needs -- that should be concerned about
"overstretch," to say nothing of "imperial"
overstretch.
In sum, the U.S. military budget could
vary over a considerable range without raising the specter of economic harm or national
decline. This is not a plea for adopting the
high end of that range, or for otherwise as14

saying the desirable size of the military budget. But the amount of resources that the
United States devotes to defense programs
should be determined primarily on non-economic, and essentially political -- that is, national security -- grounds, with little fear of
undermining this nation's position in the
world.

15

Notes
1.

Ishaq Nadiri, "Increase in Defense Expenditure and Its Impact on the U.S. Economy," in David Denoon, ed., Constraints on
Strategy (New York: Pergamon, 1986), p.
53.

2.

See Martin Feldstein, Budget Deficits, Tax
Rules and Real Interest Rates, Working Paper 1970 (Cambridge: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1986).

3.

William Niskanen, "Uneasy Relations Between Budget and Trade Deficits," Cato
Joumal, Fall1988, pp. 507-520.

4.

Kenneth Boulding, "The Impact of the Defense Industry on the Structure of the
American Economy," in Bernard Udis, ed.,
The Economic Consequences of Reduced
Military Spending (Lexington: Lexington
Books, 1973), pp. 225-252.

16

